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NATURALISTIC ETHICS AND
THE ARGUMENT FROM EVIL
Mark T. Nelson

Philosophical naturalism is the world view which tries to describe and explain
all aspects of reality in purely natural, i.e., non-supernatural terms. Such a
world view is a cluster of views usually including atheism, physicalism,
radical empiricism or naturalized epistemology, and some sort of moral relativism, subjectivism or nihilism. In this paper I examine a problem which
arises when the naturalist offers the argument from evil for atheism. Since
the argument from evil is a moral argument it cannot be effectively employed
by anyone who holds the denatured ethical theories which the naturalist
typically holds. In the context of these naturalist ethical theories, the argument from evil fails to provide good reasons for either the naturalist or the
theist to disbelieve in the God of theism. Obviously, this does not prove that
naturalism is false, or that the argument from evil is unsound, but rather that
certain naturalists' use of the argument has been misguided.

Introduction

c.

S. Lewis, in an account of his early life, reports of his late boyhood:
I was at this time living, like so many Atheists and Antitheists, in a whirl of
contradictions. I maintained that God did not exist. I was also very angry
with God for not existing. I was equally angry with Him for creating a world.
(Lewis, 1955, p. 115)

Lewis, of course, recognizes his error here: one cannot coherently believe
that God doesn't exist and also be angry with him because he created a world.
Other thinkers, however, seem to commit a similar error without even the
mitigating excuse of adolescence. The error I have in mind consists in arguing
for a form of philosophical naturalism in a certain way. In discussing this
error I shall proceed as follows: I shall describe the philosophical naturalist,
I shall identify her various views, including her views on the existence of
God and the nature of ethics, and I shall argue that, given her view of ethics,
her arguments about God are misguided.
This philosopher, whom I allege to be misguided, is perhaps best called a
"naturalist;" she holds the world-view that reality is best described in purely
natural, i.e., non-supernatural, non-transcendent terms. In fact, naturalism is
really a cluster of views about both substantive and methodological issues: the
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naturalistic or "scientific" account of reality in general, of humans in particular,
of values and of judgment. 1Ypically, this cluster includes physicalism (entailing
mindfbody monism), radical empiricism or "naturalized" epistemology, atheism
or agnosticism, as well as some form of moral relativism or moral sUbjectivism.
Such a view may also include commitments to nominalism and determinism.
Obviously, most members of this cluster can be, and have been, held independently of the others, yet, historically, these views seem to have had a
natural affinity for each other. Jointly they constitute what William James
called "tough-minded" philosophy, and they find adherents, or perhaps approximate adherents, in Lucretius, Hobbes, Hume, Russell, and Mackie.
Tough-minded or not, there is a problem in certain arguments for this total
view, but in order to show this, I shall need to single out two component
views for examination first.

Atheism and the Argument from Evil
The first component view I shall examine is the naturalistic account of God
and/or belief in God. The typical, thoroughgoing naturalist is, of course, not
a theist. She may be an agnostic, claiming that there is no conclusive reason
to suppose either that there is or that there is not a God, or she may be an
atheist, claiming that there is in fact no God. I shall restrict my remarks to
the second sort, the atheistic naturalist.
The reasons usually offered for atheism are manifold and familiar, including
the naturalistic explanation of religious experience and belief, the claim that
since science has successfully explained more and more of reality, the theistic
hypothesis is increasingly superfluous, and the general claim that we lack any
strong evidence for the existence of such a being as God. Of course, these
reasons, even if cogent, do not suffice to establish that God does not exist; rather,
they tend to remove positive reason for believing that he does. The careful atheist
generally goes further, and argues that there are positive reasons to suppose that
God does not exist, the most important of which is the argument from evil.
Well-known to most philosophical readers, the argument from evil finds its
classic rhetorical expression in Epicurus, quoted approvingly by Philo, in
Hume's Dialogues Concerning Natural Religion:
Is he [God] willing to prevent evil, but not able? Then is he impotent. Is he
able, but not willing? Then is he malevolent. Is he both able and willing?
Whence then is evil? (Hume, 1779, p. 198)

The argument implicit in Epicurus' questions can be stated formally as follows:
(1) If there were an all-good, all-powerful God, then there would be little
or no evil in the world.
(2) But there is much evil in the world.
(3) Therefore, there is no all-good, all-powerful God.
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This version of the argument is clearly valid, so comment on the truth of the
premises is in order. The case for premise (2) is generally regarded as straightforward, and is based on the empirical observation of things such as natural
disasters, war, human cruelty and the moral jUdgment that these things are
bad or evil.! The case for premise (1), on the other hand, is generally regarded
is a little less straightforward. Few thinkers would regard (1) as self-evident;
at any rate, it is fairly clearly not a truth of logic, in that its denial is not a
logical contradiction. 2 Rather, (1) is to be taken as the conclusion of another
argument, also suggested by Epicurus' questions:
(4) If there were an all-good God, he would want there to be little or no evil
in the world.
(5) If there were an all-powerful God, he could bring it about that there were
little or no evil in the world.
(6) Therefore, if there were an all-good, all-powerful God, he would want,
and be able, to bring it about that there were little or no evil in the world.
(7) Anytime an agent wants it to be the case that X, and is able to bring it
about that X, then it is the case that X.
(8) Therefore, if there were an all-good, all-powerful God, there would be
little or no evil in the world.

Obviously, this is not a sound argument, since (7) is false. 3 No doubt the
argument can be revised and qualified, but for simplicity's sake, I will leave
it in its unqualified form, especially since the above-mentioned defect is
irrelevant to the present discussion, and the point I wish to make would apply
to most revised versions as well.
The point I wish to make concerns (4) in particular, the claim that an
all-good God would want there to be little or no evil in the world. The sense
of this claim is that God wouldn't be all-good if he didn't want a world with
little or no evil in it. That is, he would somehow fail morally, if he didn't
want such a world, or if he wanted a world with lots of evil and suffering in
it. This failure could be understood as a failure to perform some duty, or
perhaps in some other way, say, as a failure to exhibit some crucial virtue
such as love. However this failure is to be understood, (4) must be construed
as an essentially moral premise, and both those who accept premises like (4)
and those who reject them seem to agree on this. Theodicist Richard Swinburne, for instance, states that
The theodicist will claim that it is not morally wrong for God to create or
permit the various evils, normally on the grounds that doing so is providing
the logically necessary conditions of greater goods. The antitheodicist denies
these claims by putting forward moral principles which have as consequences
that a good God would not under any circumstances create or permit the evils
in question. (Swinburne, 1977, p. 82)

Similarly, antitheodicist 1. L. Mackie treats premises like (4) as essentially
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moral premises, and criticizes attempts to judge God's goodness according
to principles different from the principles of ordinary human goodness.
Mackie approvingly refers to James Mill, who
looked upon religion as the greatest enemy of morality, 'above all, by radically vitiating the standards of morals; making it consist in doing the will of
a being, on whom it lavishes indeed all the phrases of adulation, but whom
in sober truth it depicts as eminently hateful.' In effect God is being called
good, while at the same time he is being described as bad, that is as having
purposes and acting upon motives which in all ordinary circumstances we
would recognize as bad .... (Mackie, 1982, p. 156)
In sum, then, the argument from evil as I have represented it here is an
essentially moral argument in that at least one of its premises is itself a moral
judgment or is based on a moral jUdgment. 4 Moreover, so is every other
version of the argument, so far as I know.

Naturalism and Ethics
Having characterized the argument from evil as an essentially moral argument, I wish to examine the "fit" between this pre-eminent argument for
atheism, and the view of morality ordinarily associated with philosophical
naturalism. I tum, then, to a brief discussion of the naturalistic picture of
morality.'
The naturalistic picture of morality-and of value generally-is largely
derivative from other aspects of the naturalistic world view, especially from
naturalistic views on science. Generally, the naturalist supposes that what he
thinks of as the "scientific" picture of the world is largely correct, at least
more correct than any other picture of the world, so in the event of conflict
between what he takes to be the claims of science and the claims of some
other source or discipline, the claims of science win. 6
To this view on science, the naturalist adds a view on the nature of morality,
the view that if morality were to work the way it has been traditionally
conceived to work, the world would have to contain certain unusual things. 7
Mackie, for instance, insists that
If there were objective values, then they would be entities or qualities or

relations of a very strange sort, utterly different from everything in the universe. Correspondingly, if we were aware of them, it would have to be by
some faculty of moral perception or intuition, utterly different from our
ordinary ways of knowing everything else. (Mackie, 1977, p. 38)
As soon as the naturalist realizes that her naturalistic, scientific picture of the
world does not have room for such sui generis moral entities, she usually
concludes that morality cannot be the objective, universal and necessary
affair that it was once taken to be. 8 Gilbert Harman owns up to this conclusion
explicitly when he notes that
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... a 'naturalist' as I am here using the term is not just someone who supposes
that all aspects of the world have a naturalistic location in this way, but rather
someone who takes it to be of overriding importance in doing moral philosophy to attempt to locate moral properties. My claim is that, when one takes
this attempt seriously, one will tend to become skeptical or relativistic. (Harman, 1984, p. 34; emphasis added)

Now, perhaps not all naturalistic approaches to ethics must be skeptical or
relativistic. Perhaps, it may be suggested, it is possible to begin with the
naturalist's picture of the world and constraints on methodology and still end
up with a workable, objective and non-relativistic ethical theory. Indeed, it
may be possible, but I, for one, am not sanguine about its chances, and the
history of philosophy is fairly littered with failed attempts at such. Most of
us are familiar, for instance, with the litany of complaints which has been
lodged against Mill's alleged proof of his principle of utility, and I personally
am inclined to agree with Sidgwick's gloomy judgment that utilitarianism
cannot be reconciled with rational egoism without recourse to some transcendent aspect of reality. Obviously, utilitarianism is just one example and personal confession is no substitute for argument. I can't argue the point here,
so I will merely record my doubts about successful, non-relativistic ethics
born of philosophical naturalism. In any event, I will confine my remarks to
relativistic or non-objective naturalistic theories of morality.
Anyway, if the naturalist cannot regard morality as something objective or
universal, she will, naturally enough, regard it as something sUbjective or
relative, created rather than discovered, or perhaps even a colossal mistake
altogether. Either way, morality turns out to be very different from what the
ordinary person thinks it is, and when the ordinary person makes a moral
judgment, she does something very different from what she thinks she is
doing.
The naturalist's account of what morality and moral judgment tum out to be
can vary, and will depend to a certain extent on other aspects of the total world
view in question. I shall layout what I take to be three important naturalistic
treatments of morality, beginning with a version of moral relativism.
Moral relativism is, of course, notoriously difficult to frame in a way that
is neither self-contradictory nor trivially true. Perhaps the clearest and most
forceful interpretation of relativism is "code relativism," of the sort defined
by Harman. 9 According to code relativism, since there is no place in the world
as described by science for objective values, moral judgments can't sensibly
involve, or be about, such things. Consequently, moral judgments or value judgments are best understood as expressing the customs, ideals, or expectations of
a particular group or person. Every moral judgment, then, is implicitly relativized
to the code of some group or person, much the way that every traffic law, for
instance, is relativized, or makes references, to the laws of some state or country.
That is, just as the claim "Right-hand turns on red are legal" is better interpreted
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as, "Right-hand turns on red are legal according to the laws of (say) Virginia,"
so the moral claim "Humility is good," is better interpreted as "Humility is
good according to the traditional Judeo-Christian code."
Obviously, on this view morality is neither universal nor necessary, since
theoretically there can be divergence between codes on virtually every point.
The same thing can be good according to one code and bad according to
another, and there can be no code-independent moral adjudication between
codes. The code relativist can still make moral judgments, but when these
judgments range over someone holding a different code, the holder of the
other code need not care about the judgments or regard them as binding her.
So, if the code relativist catches Smith doing X, and points out that, "Anyone
who does X violates her duty according to code C," Smith may respond, "That
may be, but according to code S, which I accept, doing X does not violate
some duty."
The code relativist may force Smith to stop what she was doing, or persuade
her to stop, but there is no code-independent way in which Smith was just
"plain, old wrong," and no way which Smith need morally to accept. The
"bite" of moral criticism, therefore, is seriously weakened, but so far as I
know, both the champions and the critics of code relativism recognize this
implication.
More radical, perhaps, than code relativism is the second naturalistic account of morality which 1 shall examine, moral subjectivism. Like the code
relativist, the moral subjectivist assumes that there is no place in the world
as described by science for absolute values, and similarly concludes that
moral judgments and value judgments must be about something else. According to the moral subjectivist, however, such judgments do not express codes
so much as personal feelings or attitudes. lo Bertrand Russell seems to have
held such a view when he said,
... when we assert that this or that has 'value,' we are giving expression to
our own emotion, not to a fact which would still be true if our personal
feelings were different. (Russell, 1935, p. 242)

So, moral judgments are relativized to the speaker's attitudes in much the
same way as statements of taste are. Just as the judgment "This cheeseburger
is great" is better understood as the exclamation "I heartily approve of this
cheeseburger!," so the judgment "Humility is good," is better understood as
the exclamation "I approve of humility!"
Again, morality turns out to be neither universal nor necessary, since personal feelings can and do vary widely on virtually every point. The same
thing can be approved of by one person and disapproved of by another, and
there can be no feeling-independent moral adjudication of feelings. The moral
subjectivist can, of course, still make moral judgments, but as before, when
they range over a person with different feelings and attitudes, that person will
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not necessarily care about these judgments or regard them as binding on her.
So, if the moral subjectivist catches Smith doing X, and exclaims, "I disapprove of X," Smith may respond, "That's somewhat interesting, but I approve
of X." As before, the moral subjectivist may be able to get her to stop, but
there is no feeling-or-attitude-independent sense in which Smith is wrong,
nor any which she need morally to accept. Again, the bite of moral criticism
is seriously weakened, and again, this implication is recognized by both the
friends and foes of moral subjectivism.
More radical still than either moral subjectivism or code relativism is the
third naturalistic approach to morality which I shall consider, moral nihilism.
The moral nihilist agrees with both the code relativist and the moral subjectivist that there are no objective values, but concludes that since moral judgments and unavoidably about objective values (or involve them), moral
judgments are, strictly speaking, false. In fact, moral nihilism is called the
"error theory" by one of its chief proponents, J. L. Mackie, who writes
Moral skepticism must, therefore, take the form of an error theory, admitting that
a belief in objective values is built into ordinary moral thought and language, but
holding that this ingrained belief is false. (Mackie, 1977, pp. 48,49)

So, according to the moral nihilist all, or nearly all, positive moral judgments
are false in the way that certain other categories of judgment which refer to
non-existent things are false. That is, the judgment "Humility is good" is just as
false as the judgment "Phlogiston is abundant," and for a similar reason. Clearly,
the moral nihilist cannot make positive moral judgments at all, and if she catches
Smith doing X and is tempted to judge Smith's doing X as morally wrong, she
had better restrain herself, since on her own view, the only things that could
possibly command the sort of assent requisite for a moral judgment simply do
not exist. In sum, moral criticism loses its bite altogether on this view, and moral
nihilists and their critics alike recognize this fact.

Naturalistic Ethics and the Argument From Evil
Having surveyed what are perhaps the three dominant naturalistic treatments of morality, I think that the conclusion I wish to draw is by now
obvious: the philosopher who accepts anyone of these approaches is in no
position to offer or take the argument from evil as a strong reason for atheism.
The argument from evil is an essentially moral argument in that it relies on
at least one moral judgment as a premise or as a reason for a premise, but
each of these three naturalistic treatments of morality undercuts the use of
any such moral premises. 1l
Consider, according to these three views, the status of
(4)

If there were an all-good God, he would want there to be little or no
evil in the world
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According to the code relativist, (4) is better read as
(4*)

If there were a God who was all-good according to code C, he would
want there to be little or no evil in the world.

and simply reflects (presumably) the speaker's code. Yet, code C is not
necessarily the same as the theist's code (let alone God's); moreover, if this
is so, there need be no code-independent reason for the theist (or God) to
hold code C.12 So, if code C is not the theist's code, then the conclusion of
the argument from evil is of little concern to the theist. At most, the argument
from evil, when offered by the code relativist, yields
(3*)

Therefore, there is no all-powerful God who is all-good according to
code C;

that is, that an all-powerful God, all-good according to the relativist's code,
doesn't exist. This does nothing to show that an all-powerful God, good according to the theist's code, does not exist, or that the code relativist should not
believe in that God, and certainly is nothing for the theist to be alarmed about.
Similarly, according to the moral subjectivist, (4) is better reinterpreted as
(4**) If there were a God of whom I completely approved, then he would
want a world with little or no evil in it

and merely expresses the attitudes or feelings of the speaker. Yet, if the
attitudes or feelings of the theist differ on this point from those of the moral
subjectivist-as we might expect-then this limits the significance of the
argument from evil. At most, it yields
(3**) Therefore, there is no all-powerful God of whom I (the subjectivist)
completely approve.

It does nothing to show that a God of whom the theist approves does not
exist, or that the moral relativist should not believe in that God, and again,
is nothing for the theist to worry aboutY
According to the ethical nihilist, premise (4) is in even worse shape than it is
according to the other two positions we have examined. According to moral
nihilism, all positive moral claims are false, so (4) is false, pure and simple. The
implications of this point are also simple: since a proof should contain no false
premises, the moral nihilist cannot regard this argument as a proof of atheism,
since on her own view it is unsound and shows nothing at all. 14

Conclusion

This conclusion, therefore, seems inevitable: the naturalist (or anyone else)
who holds any of these three accounts of morality-or of value generally-cannot take or offer the argument from evil as a reason to disbelieve in the existence
of the God of the theist. In fact, as we have seen, the moral nihilist cannot take
the argument from evil as yielding any religiously interesting conclusion at all. 15
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Before closing, a few comments and qualifications are in order. First, this
argument obviously does not apply to all naturalists. It does not apply to those
naturalists who are agnostics rather than atheists. It does not apply to those
atheists who believe in the non-existence of God for reasons other than the
argument from evil. It does not apply, finally, to those naturalists who can
consistently offer a non-relativistic, non-subjectivistic ethical theory according to which they support some premise such as (4). Earlier in this paper I
gave admittedly short shrift to non-relative, non-subjective and non-nihilist
naturalistic ethical theories. Note that even if such things are possible, it
doesn't immediately follow that (4) will be true on such a theory. One would
have to develop such a theory and draw out its implications in order to decide
whether (4) was among them.
Second, it may be worth reconsidering the possibility that a version of the
argument from evil could be offered which neither contains, nor depends on,
any premises which are moral judgments. Still, it is difficult to imagine how
it would even begin, since if the aim of the argument from evil is to show
that an all-good all-powerful God does not exist, the argument seems indelibly moral or evaluative from the outset.
Third, while not taking the argument as a reason for atheism itself, the
naturalist can still try to offer the argument as an ad hominem argument that
anyone who holds the non-relativistic ethical theory that the theist in fact
holds should reject theism. 16 That is, even if the naturalist does not believe
premises (1) and (2), she can argue that the theist must (or at least does) hold
them and that these jointly entail (3), which conflicts with theism. Since few
theists these days deny (2), the real issue is whether the naturalist can show
that the theist must, or does, accept (1). In the present context, this boils down
to whether the naturalist can show that the theist must, or does accept (4),
and this is a tall order. While some theists do accept (4) or ought to, given
their other philosophical commitments, it is by no means obvious that all do
or even should, since, for theists, the acceptability of (4) depends to some
extent on the truth about morality, and even among theists there is considerable disagreement about just what this is. In sum, it's not as if the naturalist
can point to a definite set of moral propositions which all theists must share
and say, "See! These commit you to (4)!" And the theist should be wary of
letting her critic pin some definite moral theory on her, since it may be
difficult to say what moral theory a world view commits us to, except from
a vantage point "inside" it, as it were. 17 Moreover, the theist might well regard
the ability to "handle" the problem of evil as a condition of adequacy for any
theistic theory of morality. Finally, such an ad hominem argument does not
satisfy the conditions for a disproof of the existence of an all-good, all-powerful God. IS
Hampden-Sydney College
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NOTES
1. Of course, some orthodox Christian thinkers such as Augustine seem to have denied
just this, insisting that evil does not, strictly speaking, exist, since it is a privation of being.
Still, these thinkers could reformulate (2) to claim that there exist many things which suffer
a severe privation of being. Also, it is worth pointing out that Augustine need not be
interpreted as claiming that evil does not exist, but rather that evil is not a thing.
2. See Plantinga (1974), pp. 7-65.
3. I can want to do X and be able to do X, but not do X, simply because doing X may
be incompatible with doing Y, which I want to do more. Of course, any sophisticated
version of the argument from evil would be framed so as to avoid these difficulties.
4. For my purposes, I shall, simplistically perhaps, define a moral argument as one
whose conclusion is a moral judgment, or which has among its premises at least one moral
judgment. A moral judgment is a judgment about what things, actions, or persons are
morally good or bad, right or wrong, virtuous or vicious.
5. By "naturalism" in ethics, I do not specifically intend the meta-ethical thesis that the
terms of moral discourse can be defined in purely non-moral terms, though this thesis
could be one example of the overall naturalistic approach to morality discussed here.
6. Of course, the theses of naturalism and the claims of current science are not identical.
One can be a scientist without being a naturalist, or vice versa.
7. Robert Westmoreland has pointed out the need to distinguish between what I call
naturalistic ethics and what may be called ethics which are compatible with philosophical
naturalism. I take the difference to be this: what I call naturalistic ethics are ethical theories
developed on the premise that value and obligation must first be "located" in the world
of nature as revealed by science. On the other hand, ethics which are compatible with
naturalism are ethical theories which, it is alleged, are compatible with the overall
naturalistic picture of the world. These may include naturalistic ethics of the first sort, but
may also include, interestingly, theories which purport to be compatible with virtually any
metaphysics. For an example of this latter view, see Ronald Dworkin (1985), pp. 171-77.
8. For other examples of this naturalistic treatment of morality, see Harman (1977, 1984).
9. See especially Harman (1977). A similar version of relativism is developed and
criticized by Jorge Garcia (1988).
10. I am lumping together under the general heading of subjectivism both classical subjectivists and classical emotivists. While I am aware of the significant differences between these
positions, they share the relevant feature of believing that ethical judgments are best understood
as expressing, being about, or being indexed to, the subjective states of humans.
11. In the foregoing discussion, I have tended to emphasize moral judgments concerning
rightness and obligation. William Alston has pointed out that, in addition to judgments
concerning moral rightness and obligation, the argument from evil usually involves
evaluative judgments as well (e.g., premise (2». These judgments are vulnerable to the
same problem that I raise against those concerning rightness and obligation. For example,
if a judgment about evil such as (2) must be relativized to the naturalist's code, then
references to evil in (1) and (4) will have to be similarly relativized in order to keep the
argument valid, but then (4) will become:
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(4') If there were a God all-good according to the naturalist's code, he would want
there to be in the world little or no evil according to the naturalist's code
which, when plugged into the subsequent argument, does not yield a conclusion which
touches the theist.
12. In fact, I should think it very unlikely that the moral code of a naturalistic relativist
would be identical, or even largely similar, to that of a theist, especially of the traditional
Judeo-Christian sort. This seems especially unlikely with respect to the issue at hand-the
evaluation of world-makers, a category largely absent from naturalistic discussion.
13. Peter Geach makes a similar point in passing when he notes that "It is mere
impertinence for someone who holds a non-cognitive view of our ascribing good and evil
to persons or actions to pretend that on his footing there is any problem of evil at all. If
my moral code, let us say, is a system of imperatives that 1 freely choose to promulgate,
or if it amounts to saying 'I approve of this and 1 hope you will too; -then it is merely
grotesque to imagine this sort of thing addressed to God. We have here a mirror image of
the error that God decrees good and evil arbitrarily. Only of course if it were so, we should
have to respect his decrees; and he needn't respect ours" (Geach, 1972, p. 39).
14. Of course, the thinking nihilist can dispense with anything so indirect as the
argument from evil and assert that theism must be false, since it is on its face incompatible
with nihilism. That is, if all positive moral claims are false, then it is false that there exists
an all-powerful, ail-good God.
15. All of this does yield the curious conclusion that one way the theist could avoid the
argument from evil would be to establish moral relativism or moral subjectivism-though
how a theist could regard these moves as acceptable is beyond me.
16. Here, 1 mean 'ad hominem argument' in the literal sense, that is, an argument aimed
at some specific person, in this case the person who accepts theism and also a full-blooded,
non-relativistic ethical theory.
17. In so saying, I do not mean to endorse a sort of theistic relativism or subjectivism. Rather,
1 mean only to suggest that a theist-particularly a theist within some particular religious
tradition such as Judaism or Christianity-might reasonably suppose that "living out" that
world view puts one in a better position to flesh out the antecedently unsettled details of that
world view; better, that is, than that of one who is not living out that world view.
18. 1 wish to thank William Bracken, Richard Creel, Hugh Fleetwood, and Robert
Westmoreland for numerous helpful comments and criticisms on this paper; Jane Hoiland
and Pauline Brand Nelson for help in preparing the manuscript; and Hampden-Sydney
College for a research grant supporting this project. 1 presented earlier drafts to the Virginia
Philosophical Association, the American Philosophical Association, and the Society of
Christian Philosophers, and benefited from the comments of many, including William
Alston, James Arieti, Jorge Garcia, James Harris, David James, Penelope Mackie, John
Marshall, Philip Quinn, and David Schrader.
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